((trying to discern key points in our discussion, let me know if I drop any points))

First, we have your sharp distinction between “what we actually know” v. “what we are just speculating about”:
You ask how we can separate these non-empirical methods from ‘pure speculation’. (I’d like to note that even science involves creative, imagination – searching for models of reality that make sense of it – especially the more theoretical sciences. I think we shouldn’t expect any otherwise with non-empirical truth-seeking methods.) I think “heart” things (like emotion, intuition, and experience) need to be taken seriously as valid ways of discerning/discovering moral truth. Clearly, on their own, these aren’t enough, but when “heart” (think Romanticism) things and “head” (think Enlightenment) things (logic, reason, experiment)are in harmony and there’s a resonance or ‘fit’ and things ‘make sense’ – I think we can actually say we’re ‘getting somewhere’ with discovering truth (moral or otherwise). We are not all-knowing, and will never have truth captured and mounted on the wall, but we’ve good reason to distinguish what I take to be real progress toward truth on one hand and pure speculation on the other.

And again, I note in passing your references to “the real world”. I think some of these ’subjective’ (or, again, intersubjective?) truths we progress toward (i.e. ’speculative’ and ‘nebulous’ concepts such as: human rights, freedom, dignity, worth/value, etc.) are just as real as anything we might view through a telescope or microscope. And the objection that ‘waxing philosophical’ doesn’t really ‘get us anywhere’ is itself based on a philosophical/epistemic perspective/standpoint. What scientific experiment tells us that philosophy doesn’t get us anywhere? It is a very specifically philosophical bent that enables someone to view philosophy as worth little/not-much.

Next, you ask a key question: “how do you know that being healthy is a goal for humans?” (I take that to mean that you’d have to admit that you yourself do not ‘know’ –via the epistemic methods you accept/trust– that it is?) As for me, I’ve no problem with the fact that I ‘know’ through non-empirical means; my “head” and “heart” agree – there is wide acceptance of that goal as good – it ‘fits’ (resonance) with the rest of what I know (via all kinds of truth-seeking methods – empirical and non-empirical), etc.

Also, to borrow a phrase (which you’ll likely despise) from the preamble to the US Constitution, some truths, I think, are “self evident” (or just true). Things (above) like ‘rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘dignity’, etc. are anything but empirically-based values/goals. If all beliefs must be verified by (purely) empirical knowledge, then no sensible person could/should be against slavery (in whatever form) – or against anything for that matter.

And of course, the question is raised who are the epistemic police who determined that all beliefs need to be empirically verified? To be clear, I always will want empirically-derived knowledge to INFORM (excuse all-caps) my beliefs, goals and values. But I think it’s unrealistic (even impossible) to imagine that empirically-derived knowledge could FORM (or validate) each and every belief – as if truth can only be found via empiricsm.

I’m hearing you say something like, “But if truth doesn’t need to be empirically verified, then people can/will believe literally anything!!”
To which I’d respond firstly (and importantly) that even the belief that ‘truth must be empirically verified’ is itself not empirically verifiable. I’d also say that I’m far less worried about people ‘believing anything’ as I would be if people were not free to both express and challenge any/all kinds of belief. Also, if there were indeed (shock, horror!) such a thing as truth that is non-empirically verifiable, then the goal (oops, there’s that word again) of truth-seeking demands that we be epistemically open to it. Heck, even empirical knowledge isn’t perfectly known, is it? Why should we expect other-than-empirical knowledge to be flawlessly discovered?

Indeed, this discerning/appreciating/’knowing’/etc. is a different kind of truth-seeking than empirical science, but (here’s the rub) we have no empirical reason to either doubt or trust these (non-empirical) truth-seeking methods. We choose to trust or doubt them based on our philosophical/epistemic approach.

The problem with non-empirical methods is that I don’t think you can separate them from pure speculation. What possible test can you apply to them to test their accuracy? We can speculate all day long, invent self-consistent ideas, and wax philosophical until the cows come home but until we include the real world in the discussion, it really isn’t going to get us anywhere.

To touch on the eating/sexuality examples I gave (and your response to them); ‘nutritional science’ is wedded (in practice) to a goal of ‘health’ – and ‘health’ is a concept that is only descriptive after it is first prescriptive.

A question: how do you know that being healthy is a goal for humans?

“At bottom”, because you (I presume) reject that any ‘goals’ are actual, but are mere social constructions of varying degrees of popularity at different times/places,

I have a personal opinion along those lines but that is entirely beside the point here.

Whether or not the real world has “actual goals” of any kind (magical, objective, circumstantial, whatever) must be determined by looking at the real world! Either they exist or they don’t. Their mere statement doesn’t get us anywhere.

For you (correct me if i’m misrepresenting) we can describe behaviour, but not prescribe it. That is what I mean by ‘morality’ being in inverted commas.

We can prescribe behaviour from a governance point of view (“the law says don’t murder”) but you are really talking about some form of external or absolute prescription right? Yet again, such a thing either exists or it doesn’t and the only way to figure that out is to actually look at the real world.

Our key difference is not that I think that prescriptive morality is easy/sussed/automatic and that you think it is a waste of time. Rather, you think it’s a waste of time, and I think it’s worthwhile, basic, relevant, universal – not to mention unavoidable.

I don’t think it is a waste of time. I think it is a poorly framed concept that hasn’t been connected to the real world in any meaningful way yet. Maybe one day it will be but first we have to be brutally honest about what we actually know versus what we are just speculating about.

The point (bringing it back to the issue at hand) is that it could well be (indeed, I think it is the case) that whilst empirically-derived knowledge informs our moral judgments, our moral judgments (note: not ‘descriptions/predictions’) are always based on non-(strictly) empirically-derived knowledge, by which we discern/appreciate/perceive/’know’/apprehend certain modes-of-being/behaving that resonate with goal-sets and value-sets. Indeed, this discerning/appreciating/’knowing’/etc. is a different kind of truth-seeking than empirical science, but (here’s the rub) we have no empirical reason to either doubt or trust these (non-empirical) truth-seeking methods. We choose to trust or doubt them based on our philosophical/epistemic approach.

Further, I’m not wanting to deny that descriptions/predictions cannot be relevant to morality. I’d just want to carefully distinguish between a descriptive mode of analysis (i.e. [making these stats up] 65% of males age 13-45 have stolen an item of greater value than $50; – or 14% of married men admit to desiring sexual relations with their partner’s cousin; etc.) and a prescriptive mode of analysis (i.e. stealing is immoral; or infidelity are immoral).

Of course, one could (some do) have the view that both stealing and infidelity are a-moral or moral. And this raises the link between goals and morality. ‘Stealing’ has no meaning apart from the notion of ‘possession’ and the goal of ’sharing’/’stewarding’/etc. things. Likewise, ‘infidelity’ has no meaning apart from the notion of ‘fidelity’ and the goal of stable, committed relationships/families/communities, etc.

To touch on the eating/sexuality examples I gave (and your response to them); ‘nutritional science’ is wedded (in practice) to a goal of ‘health’ – and ‘health’ is a concept that is only descriptive after it is first prescriptive. Speaking strictly in biological terms, the universe does not care whether any biological organism lives or dies, is ‘healthy’ (our idea of it) or ‘unhealthy’. We have (prescriptively) judged that certain biological states are ‘not the way it is supposed to be’ – but it could just as easily be the case (as far as nature is concerned) that we are all ‘meant’ to be ‘overweight’, ’sick’, etc. ‘Health’, then, is a subjectively-discerned (perhaps more accurate to say ‘intersubjectively’) goal for biological functioning; first formed non-empirically, and only then informed by empirically-derived knowledge. Same for sexuality, etc.

On the phrase “actually right/wrong”, this hilights the stark difference between our positions. “At bottom”, because you (I presume) reject that any ‘goals’ are actual, but are mere social constructions of varying degrees of popularity at different times/places, you wouldn’t be able to say that any behaviour has any actual (prescriptive) moral significance. Put more simply, the degree to which actions have real/actual moral significance is directly proportional to the degree to which goals are real/actual.

For you (correct me if i’m misrepresenting) we can describe behaviour, but not prescribe it. That is what I mean by ‘morality’ being in inverted commas.

Our key difference is not that I think that prescriptive morality is easy/sussed/automatic and that you think it is a waste of time. Rather, you think it’s a waste of time, and I think it’s worthwhile, basic, relevant, universal – not to mention unavoidable.

Your approach, for example, concerning the prioritisation of empirically-derived knowledge over non-empirically-derived knowledge, is itself a hugely philosophical one.

My approach is simple. Anything that we can observe existing exists for all intents and purposes. Anything that we can’t observe existing is irrelevant. This goes for gravity, cows, morality, apples or gods. All your work is ahead of you to convince me that something we can’t observe is relevant.

I’d also want to argue that there are fewer more ‘immediate’, ‘relevant’, ‘down-to-earth’, ‘grounded’, or ‘real-world’ areas of enquiry than ethics/morality (in the prescriptive sense).

IMO prescriptive morality is the subjective study of governance strategies, not of any deep seated reasons or motivations for behaviour.

Healthy/unhealthy eating has very real, earthy effects on real people.

And is the subject of nutritional science, not morality.

Healthy/unhealthy sexuality has real, devastating effects on abused children, addicted adults, confused teenagers (I work with youth), etc., etc.

And is the subject of psychology, physiology, and the rest of it, not morality.

Just because there are complex (a more positive word would be ‘interesting’) differences of view/understanding/approaches to morality doesn’t in the slightest make it useless, abstract philosophising.

Those differences in approaches are what the descriptive science of morality is all about which is kind of my point.

Defining morality as (only) ‘describing and predicting’ moral thoughts/behaviour leaves no sense of morality being about what is actually right/wrong,

Before this statement makes sense you would need to go have a look at the real world and tell me why it makes sense to use the phrase “actually right/wrong”. There is a massive assumption in that statement that is unbased in my opinion. If we stop making that assumption then all we have left is the descriptive science.

I will note that a descriptive approach doesn’t rule out that some sort of objective prescription exists – it just requires that we observe it in action.

and thus would (on that view) necessitate the use of ‘inverted commas’ for every use of the word ‘morality’.

Perhaps that’s not such a bad thing

I’d also want to argue that there are fewer more ‘immediate’, ‘relevant’, ‘down-to-earth’, ‘grounded’, or ‘real-world’ areas of enquiry than ethics/morality (in the prescriptive sense). Healthy/unhealthy eating has very real, earthy effects on real people. Healthy/unhealthy sexuality has real, devastating effects on abused children, addicted adults, confused teenagers (I work with youth), etc., etc. Just because there are complex (a more positive word would be ‘interesting’) differences of view/understanding/approaches to morality doesn’t in the slightest make it useless, abstract philosophising.

Defining morality as (only) ‘describing and predicting’ moral thoughts/behaviour leaves no sense of morality being about what is actually right/wrong, and thus would (on that view) necessitate the use of ‘inverted commas’ for every use of the word ‘morality’.

I’ll cut my rambling off there.

@Dale:

I’d want to first challenge the notion that morality (as morality) could be studied in a descriptive sense. Morality/Ethics, the attempt to a) perceive/understand/’know’ and (presumably!) b) act/behave/do that which is good, right, ethical, moral, etc., is by its very nature a prescriptive enterprise.

Again I’d agree in a philosophical sense but if you are going to actually get to any answers you are going to have to find a way to include the actual real world in that discourse and I don’t think we can. All we know is that people tend to think and behave in certain ways. That’s it. We don’t have any more information than that.

I also note that you seem quite clearly to have an epistemic preference (bias?) which appears to be forcing you to see non-empirical truth-seeking methods as (automatically?) unreliable –

Non-empirical truth-seeking methods may also be known as philosophy and you may recall my view on philosophy from our chat

even (strangely to me?) in such a clearly non-empirical (metaphysical) field of enquiry such as morality/ethics. I’m picking this up from your language such as: “vague nebulous concepts” and “just speculation” and “think about”…

At some point the real world has to be involved for the concept to have any relevance. What can we possibly know about the world that isn’t grounded in that world?

IMO morality is another one of those issues that has become a linguistic exercise and has lost most of its touch with the real guts of the issue which is describing and predicting how people think and behave.

Incidentally this approach doesn’t rule out an objective moral code or even god – it just requires that they actually exist and actually have an effect on the world

I’d want to first challenge the notion that morality (as morality) could be studied in a descriptive sense. Morality/Ethics, the attempt to a) perceive/understand/’know’ and (presumably!) b) act/behave/do that which is good, right, ethical, moral, etc., is by its very nature a prescriptive enterprise.

Then, I’d want to raise again my strong conviction that morality/ethics is tied inseparably to teleology, and that without reference to a ‘goal’ or ‘end’ or ‘telos’, no activity/action/behaviour can be said to be ‘off course’, ‘immoral’, ‘wrong’, ‘negative’, ‘bad’, or ‘erroneous’, etc.

I also note that you seem quite clearly to have an epistemic preference (bias?) which appears to be forcing you to see non-empirical truth-seeking methods as (automatically?) unreliable – even (strangely to me?) in such a clearly non-empirical (metaphysical) field of enquiry such as morality/ethics. I’m picking this up from your language such as: “vague nebulous concepts” and “just speculation” and “think about”…

I’ll leave it there for now,

-d-

“Morality is the degree to which an entity, through choice, will achieve a defined goal.”

I.e. without a goal defined (whether you believe from God or self or group) then morality is meaningless. Without the ability to choose morality is meaningless.

Saying “killing another human is wrong” is a short-hand way of saying “killing another human is wrong if you want to [define goal here (i.e. 'live without fear'|'please God'|'please my friends'|etc)]“. I think that most moral statements have some kind of implied goal even if not consciously.

I think most people when talking of objective morality mean either ‘prescribed’ morality (which would be subjective to the prescriber) or a goal so narrowly defined that there is only one set of actions that will work.

When it comes to the inevitable question of free will I think that this definition can cover either genuine free will (if such a thing exists) or any of the other forms of determinism so long as you are happy to allow that the ‘judging’ of actions as moral or immoral are a part of a determined system too.

I think that “wrong” (killing someone) is related to “wrong” (incorrect key) but that we tend to label things morally wrong the more they affect us emotionally.

That’s where I’m at with the question of morality at the moment. But I also know that I’ve been “wrong” about plenty of things in the past