Thanks yourself.

p.s. You might find it an interesting thought experiment to consider how you would demonstrate the meaning of ‘moral’ to someone who did not know what it meant, and whether their understanding would match your own. Could you show them that ‘moral’ applied to every situation, or would you have to compare particular outcomes instead? In the latter case, wouldn’t they come to understand particular consequences as ‘moral’, rather than situations? Some food for thought, anyway.

I think I have understood your point about the importance of context in moral decisions. I never suggested that we should ignore it. I just don’t think you can use the bewildering complexity of situational details, which may or may not be important, to justify any conclusion so general as “all situations are moral”. Indeed, the complexity of moral outcomes construed in its broadest sense seems to me a good argument, conjoined with the view above about morally equivalent situations, *against* the presumption that “all situations are moral”. What possible evidence could be given that the moral value of two actions differ at all, if we allow the tallying process of consequences to continue into infinity? What kind of person could have the foresight to correctly predict the consequences of the action which was not taken? Not us, certainly.

Next, you ask how we might know what counts as ’sufficient moral consequences’. My point here is to suggest that whereas some moral consequences are both severe and probable, others are minor and unlikely. The former are more deserving of our attention than the latter. But since we have a finite amount of time to plan our actions, energy, and interest, it seems certain that there will be moral consequences that we simply cannot give our attentions to – there is a practical constraint on moral reasoning. So, here is one way to clarify what that vague phrase means: a situation has sufficient moral consequences to demand our attention if and only if (1) we are able to attend to it, and (2) there is no other situation we could attend to in which we can make a greater moral difference than this one. There are probably more conditions you could add here, but regardless, ’sufficient moral consequences’ need not be arbitrary.
As for whether we can know the relevant facts, well, I don’t think you can ask for moral knowledge if you are truly supporting a pure utilitarianism without practical boundary.

Lastly, (I think this will be my last long post on this topic), you suggest that we can still call every situation ‘moral’, but that morality comes in all sorts of flavours, so this does not make moral situations necessarily homogenous. Well, quite right – nothing about the world follows from our usage of words. My point was instead that the word ‘moral’ supplied no kind of information if it is understood that ‘everything is moral’ – it could therefore be dropped from usage as superfluous. Sure, we could pick up your suggestion, and qualify our use of the word ‘moral’ so as to distinguish between situations – an ‘urgently-moral’ situation for example – but then the qualifier serves to transform ‘moral’ into a new adjective, which will still gain no semantic contribution from ‘moral’ since this part is not informative. The word ‘moral’ would be an idle cog, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase; the appearance of it in the sentence would be mere window-dressing.
To the contrary, I think ‘moral’ is a useful word, therefore I don’t see its application as universal. I think your viewpoint reduces the word ‘moral’ to banality.

I admit it – I voted for Bush in 04. Why? Because (and here’s the rub) he agreed with me on (wait for it…) ‘the (two) moral issues’… (which it doesn’t take much imagination to guess what those two issues were)

I’m so upset that I had such a narrow view of morality. Did I really think that only two of the issues related to the presidential election were moral? Were issues like the environment not moral? Foreign policy? National budget? Education? The Stance on the US Economy? Tax-policies?

Now, of course, that doesn’t demonstrate that everything is moral, but the example just came to mind…

On the pasta; no, I wouldn’t see it as a matter of only two choices – you could not buy either (or buy both, etc.).

I see your point about how a choice with (seemingly) equivalent moral outcomes would be (seemingly) non-moral, but I don’t think that it follows. Indeed, the (seemingly) equivalent outcomes are (still) moral outcomes, even if they are (seemingly) equivalent.

And, further, (hope this help my view to be understand-able) what I’m trying to suggest is that it is the context of the decision which makes it a moral decision. Again, decisions aren’t made in a (contextual) vacuum. One (maybe helpful?) way to think about actions could be to think of them as the ‘use’ of something. As moral agents, we are responsible for how we use things that we ‘have’ – namely time, power, influence, knowledge, relationships to others, money, etc. All the time, we’re (to greater or lesser degrees and with greater or lesser capabilities) ‘using’ these things.

Now your last paragraph:
Not only would we be faced with the need to discern what ’sufficient moral consequences’ worthy of our ‘attention’ (how do we know what’s sufficient or worthy of our concern?), but also I don’t think it follows that the adjective ‘moral’ becomes superfluous just from being applicable to every situation. For example, it would stand to reason (and this is my view) that whilst all decisions indeed have a moral element, this does not necessitate that all decisions are moral in the same, flat, tapioca-pudding kind of way. Every (moral) decision takes place not only by different people, but within vastly different contexts (times, places, etc.). Therefore, whilst, I do think ‘everything is moral’, I certainly think reality is varied enough for things to be ‘moral’ in vastly and richly varied ways. So – yes – I want to say at the same time that everything is important, and some things are more (morally) urgent or require a different kind of (moral) response than others…

Hope this helps you understand where I’m coming from – cheers.

But suppose that you are correct, and that there are always moral consequences, even if these are causally remote and very slight. In this case, it seems to me quite reasonable to adopt the habit of calling situations ‘moral’ only if the decisions to be made in those situations have sufficient moral consequences to demand our attention (and the agents praise or blame if they foresee them). If the adjective ‘moral’ is applied to every situation, then it becomes superfluous, even if it is correct. I suggest to you, then, that calling every situation and decision ‘moral’ is unhelpful, since it loses its power to draw our attention to what is really important. By analogy, you might deny anything is *really* flat, but if our use of ‘flat’ doesn’t distinguish between kinds of objects, then the predicate becomes worse than useless.